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payment from the same fund; the more alert will be successful.
Section 5f presupposes that all the parties have been adjudged
bankrupt, in which situation the rule of marshalling of assets
is applied. Therefore where a firm is adjudged bankrupt irre-
spective of the individual partners, whether Section 5f, which
clearly is favorable to them is to apply, depends on the vigilance
of creditors of the individual partners who likewise have been
adjudged bankrupt.
For a clearer understanding of the above, which at most is a
mere forecast as to what the Supreme Court will hold when the
issue arises, it must be remembered that before a person may
be adjudged bankrupt, he must be proved insolvent. Although
the entity of a partnership in bankruptcy had been recognized
by the weight of authority prior to the decision of Bank V. Bear,
nevertheless, it was held, that before a firm could be proved in-
solvent, the individual property of the partners plus the prop-
erty of the firm had to be insufficient to pay firm debts, and a
firm was never held to be bankrupt, as long as one of the mem-
bers was solvent. But to this holding there was a real objection
on the ground that the firm was an entity, and hence the separate
property of the partners could not be taken into cognizance.24
This objection may gain recognition in the light of Bank v. Bear,
which finally settled the question of the partnership as an entity
in bankruptcy. If it does gain recognition, the intricate ques-
tion of the administration of the separate assets of the non-
bankrupt, solvent partner, will arise. But this is anticipating
too far and has no place in this article.
The long period of oscillating decisions is over and the Su-
preme Court has decided once and for all that a partnership is
an entity in bankruptcy, which may be adjudicated a bankrupt
irrespective of the partners composing it. This decision is in
harmony with the earlier leading case of Francis v. MeNeal, and
both cases are in perfect harmony with Section 5f of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, in the light of its present interpretation.
STANLEY WEISS, '29.
THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSIENT NONRESIDENT
MOTORIST
A question of increasing importance, especially in this age of
almost universal use of the automobile, recently has been pre-
sented to the courts. It is as follows: May a state subject to
14Collier on Bankruptcy 12th Ed. p. 172 and cases thereunder; Reming-
ton 2nd Ed., Section 1348.
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the jurisdiction of its courts a nonresident, absent defendant
who has not consented to its jurisdiction nor been served with
process within the state, but who has operated an automobile
within the borders of the state in consequence of which he
caused personal injury or property damage to a local citizen?
To take a concrete example, suppose A, a resident of Penn-
sylvania, while motoring through Massachusetts on his way to
a summer home in Maine, negligently runs into and injures B,
a resident of Massachusetts. A leaves Massachusetts before Bhas an opportunity to serve him with process. Must B pursue
A into Maine, or wherever he goes, until he can secure personal
service upon him? Again suppose that A is a resident of Cali-
fornia, and that B has not the means or time to follow him untiljurisdiction is obtained. Must B suffer at the hands of the non-
resident visitor who has enjoyed the privileges which B and
other fellow-citizens made possible? Has B no remedy through
the Massachusetts courts unless he catches A within the bound-
aries of the State?
Before treating this subject, a few introductory remarks must
be made to enable a clearer understanding of the discussion
given. It must be pointed out that there is an important dis-
tinction between what is known as jurisdiction on the one hand,
and what is known as due process on the other hand. These two
terms are often confused in cases. In regard to the word juris-diction, we find that there are several senses in which it alone is
used. It may refer to the internal jurisdiction of a court, that
is, the competency of one court of a state rather than another to
assume judicial power over a controversy. Another sense, and
the one in which the word will be used in this article, is the
power of a state to create rights which under the principles of
the common law will be recognized as valid in other states.' Or
as stated in an English case :2 "A court may, firstly, have juris-diction in such cases that in conformity with general jurispru-
dence and ordinary international law or usage, the courts of
other states will regard its judgments as binding, and will, with
certain exceptions, enforce the judgment within their own
states." When does a state through its courts have jurisdiction
over an individual? There are a number of bases for a valid
exercise of jurisdiction, common ones being the physical pres-
ence of the defendant within the state; or the fact that he has his
domicile within the state; or that he is a citizen or subject owing
allegiance to the state (this basis, however, is not true as among
the states of the Union, they not being recognized as inde-
"This definition is found in Section43 of Restatement No. 2 of Conflict
of laws of the American Law Institute.
'Turnbull v. Walker, 67 L. T. R. 767, 769.
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pendent nations) ; or the fact that the defendant has consented
to the exercise of jurisdiction by either appearance or contract.
Considering the term due process, we find that it refers to cer-
tain limitations, perhaps they may be called guarantees, pre-
served by the Constitution of the United States. Due process
acts as a limitation upon the exercise of jurisdiction. It is es-
sentially an Anglo-American conception, not having a place in
Continental law. Generally, it may be said that due process re-
quires not only that the state rendering the judgment shall have
some basis for securing jurisdiction over the defendant, but also
that the defendant shall be given notice of the suit and a reason-
able opportunity to be heard. Viewing the two terms together,
it may be said that jurisdiction goes to the existence of the
power, whereas due process prescribes the method in which this
power shall be used. Without due process the exercise of juris-
diction is unavailing. Perhaps an illustration will bring out the
distinction. Suppose A is a resident of St. Louis and is at a
known address where he can be personally served with process.
This clearly gives the proper Missouri court for the particular
action jurisdiction over A, he being physically present. If, how-
ever, a statute were passed in Missouri declaring that as to resi-
dent defendants whose address is known, jurisdiction could be
obtained by publication in a daily newspaper, it would probably
violate due process which declares that a man is entitled to the
best notice possible under the circumstances.
In discussing the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident,
transient motorists, an effort will be made to keep distinct, as
far as practicable, this distinction between jurisdiction and due
process. This note is therefore being divided into two parts.
First a brief review will be given of the development of the law
in dealing with the question stated at the outset of this article
and then a treatment of the jurisdictional aspects with a view to
determining the real basis of jurisdiction in these cases. And
secondly, an examination will be made into the due process re-
quirements involved.
A. THE JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS
In the leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 the rules are laid
down that the authority of every tribunal is necessarily restrict-
ed by the territorial limits of the state in which it is established,
that personal jurisdiction is not obtained through service by pub-
lication, or by actual service on the defendant outside the state,
and that in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants, there must be a service of process within the
state or voluntary appearance by the defendant.
(1877), 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
A strict adherence to these principles would preclude, in many
cases, any successful attempt to acquire jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. We find, however, that with the marked
growth of corporate organizations often conducting business in
foreign states, the ever increasing use of the automobile, and
the great volume of interstate commerce and travel over high-
ways, there is a tendency on the part of the courts to relax from
the rigid enforcement of these requirements and search about
for some new basis of jurisdiction.
Apparently the first statute4 covering the situation presented
at the outset was passed by the Legislature of New Jersey in
1908. It provides in substance that a nonresident motorist, on
entering the state, shall register his machine and also shall file
an instrument appointing the Secretary of State as his attorney
upon whom process may be served in any action growing out of
the operation of his motor vehicle within the state. Notice of
such service is to be given to the defendant by letter directed to
his postoffice address which he has supplied. Penalties are pre-
scribed for violations of the statute.
In 1909 the case of Cleary v. Johnson5 upheld the constitution-
ality of this statute, against an attack that it violated the four-
teenth amendment. In the decision the court says:
"Assuming that the right to use the highways belongs to
such nonresident owner, yet it is obviously not an absolute
right. The stringent legislative restrictions upon the use
of the highways by automobiles . . . exhibit that the
automobile is regarded as a dangerous engine.
"Resident owners can be reached by service of process
within this state, while nonresident owners, of course, un-
less by voluntary appearance, are immune . . . in the
absence of a provision like the one in question, such enforce-
ment would mean numerous suits in other state§ in the
Union, from New York to California, or, perhaps, in other
continents."
The court finally declares that the statute is neither unconsti-
tutional nor unreasonable, adding that "both residents and
nonresidents are placed upon the same footing. Both are made
amenable to the laws of the state whose highways they are
using."
In 1911 the constitutionality of the New Jersey statute was
again challenged in Kane v. State.6 Here the defendant Kane,
4 N. J. P. L. 1908, p. 613. Section 4 of Auto Act of 1908.
'(1909), 79 N. J. L. 49, 74 AtI. 538.
(1911), 81 N. J. L. 594, 80 A. 453, L. R. A. 1917B 553, Ann. Cas. 1912D
237.
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a resident of New York, had failed to comply with the statute,
and was arrested in New Jersey while driving his automobile
from New York to Pennsylvania. He claimed that the statute
was invalid as to him, because it violated the Constitution and
the laws of the United States regulating interstate commerce,
and also because it violated the fourteenth amendment. These
contentions were overruled, and he was fined. The case was
taken to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed thejudgment and held the statute constitutional.' Mr. Justice
Brandeis, after referring to the well-recognized dangers to the
public incidental to the operation of motor vehicles over high-
ways, said:
"We know the ability to enforce criminal and civil penal-
ties for transgression is an aid to securing observance of
laws. And in view of the speed of the automobile and the
habits of men, we cannot say that the legislature of New
Jersey was unreasonable in believing that ability to estab-
lish, by legal proceedings within the state, any financial lia-
bility of nonresident owners, was essential to public safety.
There is nothing to show the requirement is unduly bur-
densome in practice. It is not a discrimination against
nonresidents, denying them equal protection of the law."
From these cases it appears that a state may constitutionally
forbid a nonresident to operate an automobile within the state,
unless he has express, 8 authorized a state official to receive serv-
ice of process in actions brought against him arising out of the
operation of the automobile within the state. As is apparent,
however, this form of statute necessitates the nonresident mo-
torist entering a state to stop at the boundary line and sign the
proper form of power of attorney appointing a state official his
agent for process. It also imposes some expense upon the state
in maintaining officers to carry on this work on the numerous
highways that lead into a state. Devices to avoid such expenses
raised new issues. One such issue was whether a state might
go a step farther, and provide that voluntary entrance upon its
highways shall operate as constructive consent to be sued within
the state and be equivalent to appointing a state official as attor-
ney in fact, upon whom service of process may be made in any
controversies arising out of the operation of the motor vehicle
within the state.
Massachusetts first experimented in this field of legislation, its
statute9 providing that the operation by a nonresident of a motor
'(1916), 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. Ed. 22, 37 S. Ct. 30.
'Italics are writer's throughout article.
'Mass. Gen. Laws, Chap. 90, as amended by Stat. 1923, Chap. 431, Sec. 2.
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vehicle within the state "shall be equivalent to an appointment"
by him of a public officer as his attorney for service of process.
Notice of service and a copy of process are to be sent to the de-
fendant by registered mail, etc. Continuances may be ordered
to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend his
action.
Soon after the enactment of this statute one Hess, a resident
of Pennsylvania, while driving through Massachusetts struck
and injured one Pawloski, a resident of Massachusetts. Service
was made as provided by the statute. The constitutionality of
the statute was assailed on the ground that it purported to sub-
ject a nonresident to local jurisdiction without personal service,
which was expressly prohibited by Pennoyer v. Neff. The court
held the statute valid,'0 noting little difference in constitutional
aspects from the New Jersey statute considered in Kane v. State
where express, written appointment was required, and the
Massachusetts statute then under consideration. The court
mentioned that the statute is "plainly enacted in the exercise of
the police power," but relies mainly upon the theory that the non-
resident, by operating his automobile within the state, construc-
tively consented to the mode of service prescribed. "The case at
bar rests upon the implied consent of the defendant, arising
from the facts already stated. That principle, as a basis for
jurisdiction, is recognized in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. at page
735, 24 L. Ed. 573." The case was later affirmed by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1 and by the Supreme
Court of the United States in May, 1927.12
These decisions in thus sustaining a new and broader concep-
tion of jurisdiction undoubtedly are of considerable significance
and probably have influenced legislatures in the enactment of
laws governing nonresident motorist cases. Statutes substan-
tially like the Massachusetts one are found at the present time in
Wisconsin,13 Connecticut, 14 New Hampshire, 15 New York,- and
it is the present form of the New Jersey statute.1 7 The statutes
of each of these states differ somewhat in the requirement as to
the giving of notice to the defendant, although the New Jersey
statute has no provision for this. How this affects the matter
will appear later.
The constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute was challenged
Pawloski v. Hess (1924), 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760, 35 A. L. R. 945.
U Pawloski v. Hess (1925), 253 Mass. 478, 149 N. E. 122.
"Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274 U. S. 352, 71 L. Ed. 1091, 47 S. Ct. 632.
Wis. St. 1927, Sec. 85.15, Subs. 3.
Conn. Laws 1925, Chap. 122.
N. H. Laws 1926, Chap. 100, Sees. 32-5.
"By Amendment to Highway Law, known as Sec. 285a (1928).
"N. J. P. L. 1924, Chap. 232.
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in State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden.' Here the defendant, a
resident of Chicago, had collided with the Wisconsin plaintiffs in
their state, and service was had upon him in compliance with the
statute. The defendant relied upon Pennoyer v. Neff and Flex-
ner v. Farson.9 Because of the importance of this last case, in
that it seems to be an obstacle to the securing of jurisdiction over
nonresidents, it is well to leave the Wisconsin case temporarily
and examine its facts and decision.
In Flexner v. Farson, personal judgment was rendered in
Kentucky against two nonresident partners doing business in
that state. Service of process was not made upon them person-
ally, but upon an agent in charge of their business in Kentucky,
in accordance with the terms of a statute permitting such serv-
ice. The defendants defended upon the grounds that they did
not themselves reside in Kentucky; that their agent, as a matter
of fact, had ceased to represent them at the time of service upon
him; that the statute was unconstitutional; and that therefore
the Kentucky court had no jurisdiction and the judgment was
void. On the part of the plaintiff it was argued that the de-
fendants, by voluntarily coming within the borders of the state
to do business, thereby consented to be bound by service made in
accordance with the provisions of the Kentucky statute. The
decision was for the defendants, the court reasoning substantial-
ly as follows: A state can regulate foreign corporations doing
intrastate business, this power springing from the "fiction that
the state could exclude foreign corporations altogether," and
therefore can prescribe such reasonable conditions as it desires,
among them being that it shall appoint a local agent for service
of process. But a state cannot exclude individuals. (Article
IV, Section 2, Constitution of the United States.) Hence, the
state cannot impose as a condition to the doing of business with-
in its borders the compulsory appointment of a local agent for
service of process or declare that actual service upon the local
agent conducting the business shall be equivalent to service on
the nonresident, absent principals. The court does not rely up-
on the fact that the agency relationship had been in fact termi-
nated at the time of the service, but apparently seems to think
that jurisdiction is based upon the power to exclude, and that
without such power it can have no basis of jurisdiction over the
person. Is this a just conclusion?
Returning to State v. Belden,20 we find it disposing of the case
in these words:
"While Flexner v. Farson holds that implied consent is
(1927), 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916.
(1918), 248 U. S. 289, 63 L. Ed. 250, 39 S. Ct. 97.
Supra, note 18.
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based upon the power to exclude and that without such
power the fiction of consent cannot be indulged, we cannot
think it was intended by that decision to overrule another
line of cases in which it was held that power to regulate may
also be a basis of jurisdiction over a nonresident as held in
Kane v. New Jersey. . . . The statute under considera-
tion in Flexner v. Farson was not designated to regulate or
affect the conduct of a nonresident. It made the mere pres-
ence of an agent in the state transacting business a basis of
jurisdiction."
Flexner v. Farson is cited in subsequent cases as authority for
the proposition that a statute cannot confer jurisdiction over the
nonresident members of a partnership doing business within
the state by authorizing service of process on their agent in
charge of the business. The fact that the principals are not pres-
ent themselves, but only by agent, seems to be the keynote. Now
consider the wording of the present New Jersey nonresident
motorist statute 2 which begins: "From and after the passage of
this act any chauffeur, operator or owner of any motor ve-
hicle . . . who shall accept the privilege extended to non-
resident chauffeurs, operators and owners by law of driving such
a motor vehicle . . . shall . . . make and constitute
the Secretary of State . . . agent for the acceptance of pro-
cess. . . ." When the case arises, which has not as yet, where
the owner of an automobile sends his chauffeur into a foreign
state with a statute on the order of the New Jersey one, and the
chauffeur there injures someone, and service is had upon the
owner according to the statute, what will be the result? If it is
held that jurisdiction is secured, it will be directly contra to
Flexner v. Farson. Which will be correct? Flexner v. Farson
has found considerable criticism among legal writers. It gives
privileges and immunities to nonresident principals which were
never intended by the Constitution. And because of the fact
that the agency had in fact terminated in that case, there may be
grounds for overruling the case when the time comes.22 A real
basis of jurisdiction, however, can be inferred from this case
which will be discussed in another connection.
' Supra, note 17.
"Austin W. Scott in "Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business
Within a State," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 786, at page 890:
"There is, however, a ground upon which Flexner v. Farson may be sup-
ported. The Kentucky statute provided for service upon an agent in charge
of the business. The person served in Flexner v. Farson has ceased to be
an agent at the time when process was served upon him. Service therefore
was not in accordance with the terms of the statute, and hence was insuf-
ficient. . . . The decision is therefore reconcilable . . . and it is to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/8
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Before continuing with the nonresident motorist problem, it
is well To pause a moment and consider the general nature of ju-
risdiction and what the cases up to this point would lead one to
believe. "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power...
No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiring
jurisdiction beyond service or appearance, but the foundation
should be borne in mind." 23  This extension of the means of ac-
quiring jurisdiction has been aptly called "one of the decencies
of civilization.1 2 4 But how far can these means be extended?
It is sometimes said that the possible bases of jurisdiction over
a person are four: (1) the physical presence of the defendant
within the state; (2) the domicil of the defendant within the
state; (3) the allegiance of the defendant to the state, although
not generally recognized within the states of the Union; and (4)
the consent of the defendant. However, it is never asserted that
these are the only bases, and often the cases are finding it neces-
sary to resort to fiction in finding a "true" one.25
Looking at the cases discussed above, State v. Johnson2 and
Kane v. New Jersey 2oa can probably be placed in class four, but
it is submitted that this is not the only basis of jurisdiction.
Pawloski v. Hess2 7 presents a harder problem. We do not know,
but it is very unlikely that the defendant Hess consented in fact
to the jurisdiction. He may not even have known of the statute.
The court seems to rest its decision primarily upon "implied con-
sent," but is not this but fiction if the defendant did not consent
in fact? Surely jurisdiction, which goes to the very heart of
every lawsuit, should not rest on such a flimsy foundation.
Denying consent, can the basis be presence? Probably a state
could hold the nonresident until it has determined whether he
was involved in any accidents or not, but obviously this is not
practicable nor consistent with the "decencies of civilization."
Classes two and three of the bases of jurisdiction above mention-
ed are clearly inapplicable. What have we then, unless we resort
to fiction?
be hoped that the Supreme Court of the United States will not feel that it
is precluded by the decision from holding that a state may validly provide
for service of process upon nonresidents doing business within the state, by
service upon an agent, in actions arising in the state out of the business
carried on within the state."
I Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee (1917), 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. Ed.
608, 37 S. Ct. 343, L. R. A. 1917F 458.
" Justice Holmes in Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry (1913), 228 U. S. 346,
57 L. Ed. 867, 33 S. Ct. 550.
"5 See Austin W. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563.
Supra, note 5.
"a Supra, notes 6 and 7.
'Supra, notes 10, 11 and 12.
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In this dilemma, it is appropriate to examine the reasoning in
the Wisconsin case, State v. Belden.- The court declares that
although the decision in Pawloski v. Hess rests upon "implied
consent," that it thinks that it may be supported on another
theory. It argues by analogy to the foreign corporation cases,
first quoting from Smolick v. Philadelphia Coal & Iron Co. 29
Here Judge Learned Hand, in speaking of "implied consent" by a
foreign corporation, said:
"When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken
to have consented to the appointment of an agent to accept
service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has con-
sented at all; but the court, for purposes of justice, treats it
as if it had. It is true that the consequences so imputed to
it lie within its own control, since it need not do business
within the state, but that is no equivalent to consent; actual-
ly it might have refused to appoint, and yet its refusal
would make no difference. The court, in the interests of
justice, imputes results to the voluntary act of doing busi-
ness within the foreign state, quite independently of any in-
tent."
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky-0 is also relied upon.
Here it was held that a foreign corporation doing a strictly in-
terstate business which could not for that reason be prohibited
from coming into the state, nevertheless by the transaction of
such interstate business was doing business within the state and
was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
The Wisconsin court then declares that foreign motorists are
entitled to no greater constitutional protection. It sums up the
point poignantly in these words:
"The power to prohibit is not the sole basis of jurisdic-
tion. Power to regulate is a basis of jurisdiction of equal
dignity, and if as an incidental to the exercise of that power
the licensing state requires the foreign motorists to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the state and provides for
service upon him in a manner reasonably calculated to bring
home to him notice of the pendency of the suit, the regula-
tion is reasonable and valid."
In other words, it may be said that a state in the exercise of
its police power can regulate conduct within its territorial limits
and acts in contravention thereof furnish per se a basis of ju-
Supra, note 18.
(1915), 222 Fed. 148.
(1913), 234 U. S. 579, 58 L. Ed. 1479, 34 S. Ct. 944.
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risdiction. Of course, it is a rule that the police power must be
exercised reasonably and that due process requirements be satis-
fied. This is treated later. But have we not here a basis of
jurisdiction for Flexner v. Farson? The "privileges and im-
munities" clause of the Federal Constitution was never intended
to exclude nonresidents doing business within a foreign state
from that state's exercise of its general police power."
Professor Goodrich, in his Hornbook on CONFLICT OF LAWS,
commenting upon Pawloski v. Hess, says :32
"It is not accurate to speak of this jurisdiction as based
on consent. It may be doubtful if the out of the state visi-
tor even knows of the provision, much less consents to it.
It must be said that when one does acts (at least some kinds
of acts) in a state, it lies within the power of that state to
make him amenable to its courts in litigation arising from
those acts."
Austin W. Scott gives this excellent explanation of the foreign
corporation cases, which it is submitted applies equally well to
the nonresident motorist cases:
"A state may then in the exercise of its police power im-
pose reasonable conditions upon nonresidents wishing to do
acts within the state. The mere fact that the state may not
prevent the doing of such acts does not preclude it from
imposing such conditions. The police power is not confined
to regulations of public health, moral safety, and the like.
It affects economic as well as social conditions. . The
conditions, to be sure, must be such as fairly fall within the
proper scope of the police power, and such as do not violate
any rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."'' 2a
In the Restatement of the Law of Conflicts too, there is a fifth
basis of jurisdiction recognized. Section 82 as proposed reads:
"The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its
courts over an individual may be based upon any one of the
following facts:
(a) He is personally present within the state;
(b) He has his domicil within the state;
' Professor Beale in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws offers the fol-
lowing proposition as Section 91: "A partnership or other unincorporated
association by doing business in a state in which the partnership or asso-
ciation may be sued as a legal person subjects itself to the jurisdiction of
the state as i causes of action arising out of the business."
= Goodrich, HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT OF LAws, p. 143.
'a 32 Harv. L. Rev. 886.
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(c) He is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the
state;
(d) He has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction;
(e) He has by acts done or caused to be done by him
within the state subjected himself to the jurisdic-
tion."
Section 89 is an expansion of the last enumerated basis. It
reads:
"Except as limited in Section 90, a state may exercise
through its courts jurisdiction over an individual who has
done or caused to be done acts within the state, as to causes
of action arising out of such acts, if by the law of the state
at the time the acts were done a person by doing the acts or
causing them to be done subjects himself to the jurisdiction
of the state As to such causes of action."
This principle, as Section 9033 states, is limited in the United
States by provisions in our Constitution.
It is worth while noticing that Section 89 makes no distinc-
tion between partners or individuals, between personal or rep-
resentative conduct. Therefore, there seems to be no reason why
this rule could not govern Flexner v. Farson. Professor Beale
in charge of this Restatement so believes.3 4
Of course, regarding this rule it should be pointed out that the
doing of acts within a jurisdiction may be a basis of jurisdiction,
" Section 90: If a state of the United States cannot, without violating
some constitutional limitation, make the doing of certain kinds of acts with-
in the state illegal unless and until the person doing the acts or causing
them to be done has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state
as to causes of action arising out of such acts, the state cannot validly pro-
vide that the doing of the acts shall subject him to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state.
" This comment is found under Section 90: It is believed that it is reason-
able and expedient that a state should have power to forbid a nonresident
to engage in business within the state unless he has consented to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the courts of the state as to causes of action arising
out of the business, although under the provisions of Article IV, Section 2
to the Constitution of the United States, a state cannot absolutely forbid
citizens of other states to do business within the state. From the language
used in Flexner v. Farson . . . it might be gathered that the state can-
not under the Constitution exercise even this qualified power of exclusion.
But this view is inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court to the ef-
fect that a foreign corporation can be forced to submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of a state if it seeks to do business within the state even though
the corporation seeks to engage only in interstate commerce and cannot
therefore be excluded from the state. International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914). This view is also inconsistent with a deci-
sion . . . Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/8
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cannot apply in all cases--for instance, the making of a contract
within a state is the doing of an act, but obviously this should not
be the basis of jurisdiction over a nonresident party to the con-
tract, and a statute providing that would be void. This would
not be within the police power. On the other hand, a state may
make illegal the doing of acts which endanger the public safety,
such as the driving of automobiles, unless the person doing the
acts first consents to the exercise of local jurisdiction for causes
of action arising therefrom. Can a state make it illegal for a
nonresident to engage in business unless he has consented to
local jurisdiction and pass a statute declaring that the doing of
business within the state shall subject the nonresidents to its
courts, etc.? Certainly these acts can endanger the public wel-
fare, morals, safety, although perhaps not as directly as in the
case of nonresident motorists. But as has appeared before,
there is strong authority supporting this proposition.
In concluding the treatment of the jurisdictional aspects, it
appears that it is possible for a state in some cases to exercise
jurisdiction over a person not served with process within the
state, not domiciled therein, and not actually consenting to the
exercise of jurisdiction by that state. More specifically, it seems
that a state may subject to the jurisdiction of its courts a non-
resident motorist who has operated an automobile within its
borders, causing injury or damage to a local citizen. It is sub-
mitted that the real basis of jurisdiction in such cases lies in the
power of a state as a sovereign body to declare that when one
does certain kinds of acts within its borders, for controversies
arising as a consequence, its courts shall have jurisdiction. Of
course, as noted before, this principle is limited by the fact that
constitutional limitations must be observed. This leads us to
our second problem.
B. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Equally important with the fact that a court must have juris-
diction over the defendant in order to render a valid decree is
the fact that the due process requirements of notice and an op-
portunity to be heard be given to the defendant. A case decided
quite recently in the United States Supreme Court,35 holding the
present New Jersey statute unconstitutional as being in contra-
vention of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, will undoubtedly make legislatures more cautious in enact-
ing similar statutes.
It is worth while to investigate the statutes in the cases dis-
cussed above, as they will tend to shed some light upon what due
" Wuchter v. Pizzutti, (1928),.72 L. Ed. 313, 48 S. Ct. 259.
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process actually requires. Only the portions relating to notice
and opportunity to be heard will be quoted.
The New Jersey statute involved in Cleary v. Johnson and
Kane v. State provided:
Said commissioner of motor vehicles shall forth-
with notify such owner of such service by letter directed to
him at the postoffice address stated in his application."
The Massachusetts statute in Pawloski v. Hess provided:
Provided, that notice of such service and a copy
of the process are forthwith sent by registered mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant, and the defendant's return receipt
and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith are ap-
pended to the writ and entered with the declaration. The
court in which the action is pending may order such con-
tinuances as may be necessary to afford the defendant rea-
sonable opportunity to defend the action."
The Wisconsin statute provides:
Provided, that notice of such service and a copy
of the process are within ten days thereafter sent by mail by
the plaintiff to the defendant, at his last known address, and
that the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith is ap-
pended to the summons. The court in which the action is
pending may order such continuances as may be necessary
to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend
the action, not exceeding ninety days from the date of the
filing of the action in such court."
It will be remembered that the constitutionality of these stat-
utes was upheld.
The present New York statute, which just became effective on
July 1 of this year, provides:
Service of such summons shall be made by leaving
a copy thereof, with a fee of two dollars, with the Secretary
of State, or in his office, and such service shall be sufficient
service upon such nonresident provided that notice of such
service and a copy of the summons are forthwith sent by
registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the de-
fendant's return receipt, the plaintiff's affidavit of compli-
ance herewith, and a copy of the summons and complaint
are filed with the Clerk of the Court in which the action is
pending. The Court in which the action is pending may
order such extensions as may be necessary to afford the de-
fendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action."
This is followed by a section which is unique. For the pro-
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tection of nonresidents against nuisance suits, it provides that
the plaintiff shall give security to the defendant in the sum of$250 for the payment of costs and that the attorney for the
plaintiff shall be liable to the defendant for the costs up to $100
unless and until the security is furnished. Such a provision is
obviously valuable.
One cannot help but be impressed with the safeguards that are
provided in these statutes. The provision for notice seems am-
ply safe. In those statutes in which the burden is placed upon
the plaintiff to mail notice to the defendant, there is the require-
ment that the defendant's return receipt and plaintiff's affidavit
of compliance be filed along with the pleadings of the case. And
as one case pointed out, the plaintiff in investigating to see
whether the defendant is financially responsible and whether a
suit will be worth while, must necessarily learn the correct ad-
dress of the defendant. The former New Jersey statute had
an effective means of securing the defendant's address in requir-
ing that he furnish the same on entering the state. The Wis-
consin statute was judicially construed in State v. Welden in
these words:
"The law as enacted is calculated to give the defendant
adequate notice of the pendency of the proceeding. We
know of nothing more likely to apprise the defendant of the
pendency of the action than the mailing of a copy of the
summons and complaint to his last known address. This
must mean not his last known address known to the plain-
tiff, but plaintiff is required to ascertain at his peril the last
known address of the defendant as a matter of fact, and his
failure to do so will amount to a failure to comply with the
statute and render the service invalid."
This does not seem too harsh, because unless the notice is sent
to the defendant's actual address, we find an evasion of the law.
The New York provision for the giving of security is undoubt-
edly an excellent safeguard in this regard.
With the foregoing in mind, let us examine the New Jersey
statute as the United States Supreme Court found it in Febru-
ary, 1928, in the case of Wuchter v. Pizzutti.30 The only section
respecting service is as follows:
"From and after the passage of this act any chauffeur,
operator or owner of any motor vehicle . . . shall . .
by the operation of such automobile within the state of New
Jersey, make and constitute the Secretary of State . .
agent for the acceptance of process in any civil suit . .
in which . . . such motor vehicle is involved."
'Supra, note 35.
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No provision is made for giving notice to the defendant.
Hence the question was presented to the court of "whether a
statute, making the Secretary of State the person to receive the
process, must, in order to be valid, contain a provision making it
reasonably probable that notice of the service on the Secretary
will be communicated to the nonresident defendant who is sued."
And Chief Justice Taft, delivering the opinion of the court, held
that such a provision was necessary, saying that "the enforced
acceptance of the service of process on a state officer by the de-
fendant would not be fair or due process unless such officer or
the plaintiff is required to mail the notice to the defendant, or
to advise him, by some written communication, so as to make it
reasonably probable that he will receive actual notice."
The whole decision of the court is very instructive on the mat-
ter of due process, and one or two passages deserve quoting.
After saying that there would not be due process unless some
actual notice is received or it is made reasonably probable that
notice will be received, the Court continues:
"Otherwise, where the service of summons is limited to a
service of the Secretary of State or some officer of the state,
without more, it will be entirely possible for a person in-
jured to sue any nonresident he chooses, and through serv-
ice upon the state official obtain a default judgment against
a nonresident who had nothing to do with the accident, or
whose automobile having been in the state has never in-
jured anybody. A provision of law for service that leaves
open such a clear opportunity for the commission of fraud
or injustice is not a reasonable provision, and in the case
supposed would certainly be depriving a defendant of his
property without due process of law."
The Massachusetts statute and former New Jersey statute are
commented upon also:
"The Massachusetts statute considered in Hess v. Paw-
lo8ki really made necessary actual personal service to be evi-
denced by the written admission of the defendant. In Kane
v. New Jersey, the service provided for by statute was by
mail to the necessarily known registered address of the li-
censed defendant."
And in regard to the proper form of a statute, the court says:
"Every statute of this kind, therefore, should require the
plaintiff bringing the suit to show in the summons to be
served the postoffice address or residence of the defendant
being sued, and should impose either on the plaintiff him-
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self or upon the official receiving service or some other, the
duty of communication with the defendant."
3 7
In conclusion, one may venture to say that if a state in the
Union will enact a statute reasonably calculated to give the de-
fendant knowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard,
it will be safely within the constitutional limitations. However,
the possibilities are far from being exhausted, and we can await
with interest new developments in this field, such as for instance
what will be decided when a chauffeur alone injures a person in
a foreign state having a statute covering chauffeurs and agents
as well as the owners of the motor vehicles.
D. A. MACPHERSON, JR., '29.
Although, according to the facts of the case, which were that a Penn-
sylvania defendant was sued by a New Jersey resident for damages caused
by running into the plaintiff's wagon on a New Jersey highway, the defend-
ant had actual notice by service out of New Jersey in Pennsylvania, yet such
service was not directed by the statute, it was held not to supply constitu-
tional validity to the statute or to the service under it.
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